Showing posts with label Irish debt restructuring. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish debt restructuring. Show all posts

Friday, March 8, 2013

8/3/2013: German Lawmaker Challenges Debt Restructuring for Ireland & Portugal


Not exactly good news, and not exactly earth-shattering either, but...
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/07/eurozone-germany-bailouts-idUSL6N0BZI9320130307

The point worth raising is that if Enda & Co do achieve restructuring of our Troika loans, they would de facto deliver a restructuring of Ireland's super-sovereign debt. This raises a number of issues:

  1. Why are we seeking restructuring super-senior sovereign debt ahead of seeking to restructure non-sovereign debt, such as, for example banks debts?
  2. If restructuring were to materially impact our long-term debt profile by lowering the NPV of our debt, would this not qualify as a 'structured' or 'cooperative' default? I know - the matter here is not material, but rather a label, yet don't we have a Government that staunchly refuses to default on private debts assumed by the State and then goes for a default (or even quasi-default) on super-senior debt?
These questions closely relate to the work I have done over the recent years on Irish Government debt and most directly to my chapter in What if Ireland Defaults? (link the chapter in a working paper format here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1985617)

Friday, August 24, 2012

24/8/2012: Perverse logic of Berlin?


An interesting article in the Irish Times today (link) quoting Germany's Fin Min on Irish debt-relief proposals, saying that Ireland's "massive" reform progress should not be compromised by the country efforts to gain relief on banks-related sovereign debts. From the Irish Times: "We cannot do anything that generates new uncertainty on the financial markets and lose trust, which Ireland is just at the point of winning back."

While we should be careful not to read too deeply into Mr Schauble's comments - which can be interpreted in a number of ways - the logic of the German Fin Min is worrisome.

Ireland has raised exceedingly expensive funds in recent bonds and T-bills auctions with explicit desire to test the markets appetite for Irish paper. In many ways, the relative success of these auctions was underwritten by external dynamics in debt markets, but also by the markets perception of Irish progress on reforms and by the markets expectation of the decline in future debt liabilities related to the banks debt deal. In other words, Ireland has paid a hefty price so far for starting the process of recovering some market access for the Sovereign. This is a net positive, albeit severely limited by the cost of funding raised.

Hence, we have a bizarre situation:

  1. a member state in the Euro zone is undertaking all the right (from the markets & policymakers point of view) steps, achieving measurable progress, and generally behaving like the best pupil in the class, yet 
  2. German leadership - the proxy for the Euro zone leadership - is unwilling to help that state in its efforts.
Surely, if Germany really wants stabilization and recovery in Europe's periphery, writing down €30 billion of promissory notes would be the cheapest approach to take toward reinforcing Irish efforts to deliver on the programme. Since the funds are fully linked to the ELA, this would imply absolutely no negative effect on private markets expectations. If anything, it will signal Europe's willingness to use the monetary system to support the process of resolving banking insolvency-induced stress on the sovereigns. Reduction in Ireland's debt burden in this context will be non-trivial and will help restore bonds markets confidence in both Ireland and the Euro zone system.

The bond markets operate - basically speaking - at the following level of logic:

  • If an action reduces supply of debt, ceteris paribus, price of debt goes up, yields go down. Restructuring Irish Government's banks-linked debt will act to deliver exactly this effect.
  • If an action reduces future potential haircuts that can expected by the private sector holders of debt in the event of prababilistic restructuring, price of debt goes up and yields go down, since future expected losses on privately held debt will be lower. Restructuring officially (Euro system) held ELA will deliver exactly this.
  • If an action improves debt sustainability of the sovereign, yields will go down. Restructuring ELA will do exactly this.
  • If an action does not introduce new moral hazard into future funding incentives for the sovereign, longer-term yields will be lower. By restructuring ELA - which has nothing to do with Irish exchequer past poor performance or policy choices, but has to do with rescuing risk-taking behaviour of the foreign funders of the Irish banks - the Euro zone can achieve exactly such long-term consistent repricing of Irish debt.
  • If an action reduces the need for future funding, expected future bonds issuance falls and with it, the yields will fall. By removing the need to fund future repayments of promissory notes, the EU can achieve exactly this effect.
  • If an action improves economic growth prospects for the nation, thus lowering risks associated with future tax revenues growth, deficits and debt financing, it will reduce yields on Government debt. This, again, is something that a restructuring of ELA/promissory notes will achieve.
Any way you spin it, aggressively restructuring the promissory notes and the ELA will deliver the benefits for the Irish exchequer. If, as Mr Schauble clearly believes, there is a case for contagion of risks across the peripheral sovereigns, such benefits will also be positively felt by other peripheral economies. In addition, such benefits will also help give some much needed credibility to the Euro zone overall policy efforts in dealing with the crisis.

Wednesday, January 25, 2012

25/1/2012: Return to the Bond Markets

According to the report in FT Alphaville (link here) Ireland has 'returned' to the bond markets by carrying out a swap of a 4% coupon 2014-maturing bond for a 4.5% coupon 2015-maturing bond. This reduces 2014 outgoings on redemption of maturing bonds and forces more maturity into 2015, which has more benign profile. But the switch comes at a price - the coupon is up 12.5% on previous.

In effect, if this is less of an Ireland's 'return to the bond markets', more of Eddie 'The Eagle' Return to the Olympics type of an event. Much pomp (official announcements and Government statements to follow), no circumstance (Ireland still cannot fund itself outside the Troika agreement), and even less real substance (avoiding a total blowout in 2014 is now clearly an objective for policy measures). But hey, let it be a much needed 'green jerseying' distraction, as FT Alphaville suggests, to the gruesome reality of Ireland torching another €1.25 billion worth of taxpayers' funds on that pyre called IBRC/Anglo.

Sunday, October 16, 2011

16/10/2011: Negative Equity and Debt Restructuring

This is unedited version of my article in Irish Mail on Sunday (October 16):


This week, we finally learned the official figure for what it would cost to address one of the biggest problems facing this country.

According to the Keane Report - or the Inter-Departmental Mortgage Arrears Working Group Report - writing off negative equity for all Irish mortgages will cost “in the region of €14 billion”. Doing the same just for mortgages taken out between 2006 and 2008 would require some €10 billion.

These numbers are truly staggering, not because of they are so high, but the opposite: because they contrast the State’s unwillingness to help ordinary Irish families caught in the gravest economic crisis we have ever faced with the relatively low cost it would take to do so.

Let me explain.

Firstly, the figure of €14billion itself is a gross overestimate of the true cost of dealing with negative equity. This is because this figure appears to include not just owner-occupiers but also people with buy-to-let loans in his sums.

Secondly, the real amount required to get rid of negative equity where it matters most – for ordinary first-time buyers - is lower still. For example the scheme could be set up in a sliding scale based on value of house compared to average house prices. This would reduce the final cost of the scheme and help those who need it most - moderate income and younger-age households.

In other words, a realistic and effective debt cancellation scheme can be priced at closer to €6-8 billion instead of the €10-14 billion estimated in the report.
In its simplest form it would work like this: say you bought a house for €300,000, with a mortgage of €250,000, and it is now worth just €150,000. The government, or the bank using the recapitalisation funds they have received, would pay off the €100,000 difference.

By doing this your monthly payments would be less, and you could now sell up to pay off the debt or move house, and in the meantime the extra money you have to spend could go back into the economy.

The scheme could even be set up so that write downs would be smaller on houses with above average values so as to prioritise young and low-earning families. In the above example, if the house was purchased for, say €500,000 and is no worth half that amount, the bank would write-off, say, €200,000, leaving the household with residual negative equity of €50,000. This would still improve affordability, but will also cut the overall cost of the scheme.

So why did the report completely rule this out? It was very clear on this topic: “a blanket debt or negative equity forgiveness scheme would not be an effective use of State resources and would not solve the problem,’ it says.

But it goes further, claiming that “the primary driver of mortgage arrears is affordability, not negative equity. While a write-down of negative equity would help mortgage holders in arrears, in many cases it is unlikely to create an affordable mortgage”.

I believe this rejection betrays the overall lack of understanding by our senior civil service officials of the problems we face.

The Irish economy is suffering primarily from three things. The biggest is excessive household debt.

While this would be bad enough, it is exacerbated by two additional factors. The cost of the government’s policy of bailing out our banks, which is being paid for with higher taxes on ordinary working households. And the rising cost of mortgagesdue to aggressive drive by Irish banks to improve their profit margins at the expense of the most vulnerable mortgage holders - those with adjustable rate mortgages who cannot protest. Both contribute to mortgages defaults.

By saying that cancelling negative equity will not be a magic bullet solution to the problem of the defaulting mortgages, the report is simply referencing the smaller problem of mortgage affordability to evade addressing the effects of the much larger crisis facing us.

Negative equity is the single most egregious and damaging segment of the debt problem faced by Irish families.

It is the most egregious because it was caused not by reckless borrowing, but by reckless lending by the banks - actively supported at the time by the Irish Government.

The problem of negative equity is the result of state policy in the first place, and it is up to the state to rectify it.

And contrary to the assertion of the report and Government claims, we do have the funds to deal with negative equity. Freeing these funds to help ordinary families is just a matter of priorities for the Government and the state-controlled banks.

To-date, the Irish Government has injected €63 billion worth of taxpayers’ funds into Irish banks.

Various other commitments, and the banks’ own state-guaranteed borrowings from the Central Bank bring the total cost of keeping our banking sector working to a gross figure of about €125 billion.

Yet while they have saved the banks, all of these measures have acted to increase, rather than reduce, the level of debt being carried by the households of this country.
In addition to their own household borrowings like credit cards or credit union loans, mortgages-holders are now in effect liable both for banks’ debts and their losses on property development and investment.

In contrast, even at Keane’s upper estimates, the cost of paying off negative equity liabilities for household mortgages would require just one ninth of the funds we have made available to the banks.

Last July the Government injected some €19 billion worth of capital into Irish banks. This capital is provided to cover potential future losses on loans. This included €9.5 billion, which was the estimated worst-case scenario for losses on residential mortgages. It also included another €8.9 billion to cover remaining expected losses on commercial property.

If some of these funds were used instead to restructure negative equity mortgages on family homes it would do two things for the banks.

Firstly, because the banks would now have securities as valuable as the mortgages they have given, a mortgage default would not be such a threat in terms of losses. This then reduces the bank’s need for further capital.

Secondly, the writedown of the mortgages will prevent defaults in the first place, at least for some families.

This implies that prioritising how that money is used to help mortgages rather than losses on commercial property loans, will be a more effective way to improve their balance sheets.

And it’s not like the money is not there. Our banking system currently has surplus capital available. Since August this year, our ‘pillar’ banks, instead of helping the struggling households, have used taxpayers funds to quietly buy high-yield Irish Government bonds.

Some €3 billion worth of Government debt was bought by the banks using our money in order to beef up their own profits. Don’t tell us that the banks cannot afford negative equity restructuring when they clearly can afford buying junk bonds in the markets to book higher profits.

And the farcical nature of Irish government responses to the mortgages and personal debt crises continues.

The Keane report ruled out increasing tax relief on mortgage interest finance for first time buyers during the boom, 2004-2008. Why? Because the estimated cost each year would have been €120 million.

Yet, come November, the very same state will pay in full the unguaranteed and unsecured €737 million debt of the bankrupt zombie Anglo. Between Anglo and INBS, the state has also committed to repaying in full €2.4 billion more of similar bonds in 2012.

Instead of repaying un-guaranteed bondholders, the Government should use the funds available to the banks to cancel commercial property-related losses on banks books, freeing the capital injected for this purpose in July this year to restructure negative equity mortgages.

Earlier this year, I proposed that Irish Government impose an obligatory restructuring of all mortgages to achieve a maximum Loan-to-Value ratio of 110%.

This would reduce the problem of ‘moral hazard’ because households with greater borrowings will still be left with more debt than their more prudent counterparts. But it would also reduce the overall debt burden faced by our families, freeing them to return to active economic and social life, helping to restart the Irish economy. Based on the Keane Report’s own estimates of the cost of such a scheme we have more than enough money to make this choice.

All we need is the will - the will to free hundreds of thousands of Irish families from the negative equity jail that was built by reckless banks which lent the money with explicit approval of the previous Governments.

Monday, May 16, 2011

16/05/2011: Debt Restructuring - two insights

What if, folks... what if default or debt restructuring is the end game?

Here are two sets of thoughts on the topic. The first one is from the Lisbon Council and the second set is adopted (via my edits) from here.

Lisbon Council launched last week Thinking the Unthinkable: Lessons of Past Sovereign Debt Restructurings See , an e-brief by Alessandro Leipold, chief economist of the Lisbon Council and former acting director of the European Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). See www.lisboncouncil.net for full details

Mr. Leipold argues that "European debt resolution requires a much more forward-leaning, information-driven approach, involving
  • Supplying markets with better, more timely information (including tougher banking stress tests - I would give credit here to CBofI which did carry out much more rigorous testing of Irish 4 than the EU has ever allowed to take place across the euro area)
  • Abandoning untenable timelines (such as the “no-restructurings-before-2013” mantra), and
  • Staying ahead of the game via recourse to tools such as pre-emptive bond exchange offers
Mr. Leipold draws five key lessons from past sovereign debt restructurings:
  1. Avoid Detrimental Delays. Delays in restructuring are costly (output losses, entail “throwing good money after bad” via increasingly large official bailouts, and ultimately require a larger haircut on private claims). Realistic debt sustainability analyses are needed to detect, and communicate, the possible need for debt restructuring. The EU’s “read-my-lips: no-restructuring-until-2013” sets an arbitrary and non-credible deadline: the sooner it is abandoned, the better.
  2. Repair the Banking Sector. The equation “euro debt crisis = core European bank crisis” needs to be broken. I might add that the equation 'euro debt & banks crises = European taxpayers destruction' must be broken even before we break he debt-banks link. This requires getting tough on bank stress tests, enhancing their rigour and credibility, possibly by associating the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and IMF with European Union supervisors. Banks tests must be accompanied by much greater pressure from EU supervisors to speed up bank recapitalisation and to close down non-viable entities. Banking resolution legislation should proceed rapidly, as should creation of an EU-wide bank resolution mechanism.
  3. Remove Politics from the Driver’s Seat. The current set-up, including the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which will begin operations in 2013), "virtually ensures that EU creditor countries’ domestic political interests will play a front-and-centre role. The recent attempted quid pro quo with Ireland whereby Europe would agree to a reduction in the cripplingly high interest rate on its loans in return for changes to the Irish corporate tax code is but one indication of this. Put simply, the decision-making and governance mechanism should be distanced from the high-pitched political positioning characteristic of EU ministerial meetings, thereby also facilitating constructive communication with markets, and helping shape expectations as needed to promote crisis resolution". I can only add to this that politicization of the economic concept of debt restructuring is also evident within the PIIGS themselves. In Ireland, we have now a virtual army of pundits - many well-meaning, of course - arguing against the restructuring on the basis of (1) 'default'=evil, (2) our debts are sustainable, and (3) current path of delaying restructuring until post-2013 is the optimal choice. These are supported, in some instances via lucrative public appointments, by the political elite.
  4. Stay Ahead of the Curve with Preemptive Exchange Offers. "Traditional bond exchange offers, made preemptively, prior to an actual default, worked well in several emerging country debt restructurings over the last decade or so, including Pakistan, Ukraine, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic. Experience indicates that such voluntary restructurings need not, contrary to some claims, be too “soft” for the debtors’ needs. Reasonably priced, and with proper incentives, deals can be concluded rapidly with negligible free riding."
  5. Do Not Expect Too Much from Collective Action Clauses. "Contractual provisions such as collective action and aggregation clauses no doubt help at the margin. But they have not shown themselves to be decisive in debt restructurings. Furthermore, they cannot help in dealing with the current stock of debt".
Much of the above prescriptions/warnings is echoed in the tables summarizing debt restructuring options available to the PIIGS that I have edited based on their original source (here).

Both provide one core lesson to us - any state close to the point of no return when it comes to its debt levels (and no one is denying that we are close to that point, all arguments today are about whether we have crossed it or not) should be:
  1. Prepared to act
  2. Prepared to act preemptively
  3. Be transparent about the problems faced
On all 3 so far our officials are failing miserably, although we are making some progress on the 3rd point...