Showing posts with label PEOTUS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PEOTUS. Show all posts

Friday, January 13, 2017

12/1/17: Betrayal Aversion, Populism and Donald Trump Election


In their 2003 paper, Koehler and Gershoff provide a definition of a specific behavioural phenomenon, known as betrayal aversion. Specifically, the authors state that “A form of betrayal occurs when agents of protection cause the very harm that they are entrusted to guard against. Examples include the military leader who commits treason and the exploding automobile air bag.” The duo showed - across five studies - that people respond differently “to criminal betrayals, safety product betrayals, and the risk of future betrayal by safety products” depending on who acts as an agent of betrayal. Specifically, the authors “found that people reacted more strongly (in terms of punishment assigned and negative emotions felt) to acts of betrayal than to identical bad acts that do not violate a duty or promise to protect. We also found that, when faced with a choice among pairs of safety devices (air
bags, smoke alarms, and vaccines), most people preferred inferior options (in terms of risk exposure) to options that included a slim (0.01%) risk of betrayal. However, when the betrayal risk was replaced by an equivalent non-betrayal risk, the choice pattern was reversed. Apparently, people are willing to incur greater risks of the very harm they seek protection from to avoid the mere possibility of betrayal.”

Put into different context, we opt for suboptimal degree of protection against harm in order to avoid being betrayed.

Now, consider the case of political betrayal. Suppose voters vest their trust in a candidate for office on the basis of the candidate’s claims (call these policy platform, for example) to deliver protection of the voters’ interests. One, the relationship between the voters and the candidate is emotionally-framed (this is important). Two, the relationship of trust induces the acute feeling of betrayal if the candidate does not deliver on his/her promises. Three, past experience of betrayal, quite rationally, induces betrayal aversion: in the next round of voting, voters will prefer a candidate who offers less in terms of his/her platform feasibility (aka: the candidate less equipped or qualified to run the office).

In other words, betrayal aversion will drive voters to prefer a poorer quality candidate.

Sounds plausible? Ok. Sounds like something we’ve seen recently? You bet. Let’s go over the above steps in the context of the recent U.S. presidential contest.


One: emotional basis for selection (vesting trust). The U.S. voters had eight years of ‘hope’ from President Obama. Hope based on emotional context of his campaigns, not on hard delivery of his policies. In fact, the entire U.S. electoral space has become nothing more than a battlefield of carefully orchestrated emotional contests.

Two: an acute feeling of betrayal is clearly afoot in the case of the U.S. electorate. Whether or not the voters today blame Mr. Obama for their feeling of betrayal, or they blame the proverbial Washington ’swamp’ that includes the entire lot of elected politicians (including Mrs. Clinton and others) is immaterial. What is material is that many voters do feel betrayed by the elites (both the Burn effect and the Trump campaign were based on capturing this sentiment).

Three: of the two candidates that did capture the minds of swing voters and marginalised voters (the types of voters who matter in election outrun in the end) were both campaigning on razor-thin policies proposals and more on general sentiment basis. Whether you consider these platforms feasible or not, they were not articulated with the same degree of precision and competency as, say, Mrs Clinton’s highly elaborate platform.

Which means the election of Mr Trump fits (from pre-conditions through to outcome) the pattern of betrayal aversion phenomena: fleeing the chance of being betrayed by the agent they trust, American voters opted for a populist, less competent (in traditional Washington’s sense) choice.

Now, enter two brainiacs from Harvard. Rafael Di Tella and Julio Rotemberg were quick on their feet recognising the above emergence of betrayal avoidance or aversion in voting decisions. In their December 2016 NBER paper, linked below, the authors argue that voters preference for populism is the form of “rejection of “disloyal” leaders.” To do this, the authors add an “assumption that people are worse off when they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal”, than when such a loss of income “is the result of bad luck”. In other words, they explicitly assume betrayal aversion in their model of a simple voter choice. The end result is that their model “yields a [voter] preference for incompetent leaders. These deliver worse material outcomes in general, but they reduce the feelings of betrayal during bad times.”

More to the point, just as I narrated the logical empirical hypothesis (steps one through three) above, Di Tella and Rotemberg “find some evidence consistent with our model in a survey carried out on the eve of the recent U.S. presidential election. Priming survey participants with questions about the importance of competence in policymaking usually reduced their support for the candidate who was perceived as less competent; this effect was reversed for rural, and less educated white, survey participants.”

Here you have it: classical behavioural bias of betrayal aversion explains why Mrs Clinton simply could not connect with the swing or marginalised voters. It wasn’t hope that they sought, but avoidance of putting hope/trust in someone like her. Done. Not ‘deplorables’ but those betrayed in the past have swung the vote in favour of a populist, not because he emotionally won their trust, but because he was the less competent of the two standing candidates.



Jonathan J. Koehler, and Andrew D. Gershof, “Betrayal aversion: When agents of protection become agents of harm”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 90 (2003) 244–261: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.11.1841&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Di Tella, Rafael and Rotemberg, Julio J., Populism and the Return of the 'Paranoid Style': Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance Against Elite Betrayal (December 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22975: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2890079

Thursday, January 12, 2017

11/1/17: Mr. Trump's Plan for Addressing Conflicts of Interest is a Fig Leaf of Corporate Governance


Why PEOTUS Donal Trump’s plan to donate hotels profits earned from foreign government payments to the U.S. Treasury is a fig leaf of corporate governance measures?

Photo credit: GettyImages

There are several reasons why a commitment to donate profits arising from foreign governments' payments to his hotels will not reduce, nor even alleviate, business incentives for potential conflict of interest that may arise in the future.

Firstly, donating profits from such activities requires that profits are declared on these activities in the first place. Since profits are declared across the entire business, not on the basis of individual transactions, Mr. Trump can use full extent of tax laws and accounting procedures, including cumulated losses deductions and tax shields on investment, to effectively reduce such denotable profits to nil over the next 4-8 years. 

Secondly, profits are not the most important financial line on which Mr. Trump operates. Mr. Trump operates on the basis of business (net) worth (value of his business) which reflects not so much the declared profits, but rather the earnings generated by his businesses (cash flow basis, e.g. EBITDA) and also reflects earnings over the longer term time horizon (timing factor). 

Now, consider the following hypothetical scenario: suppose Mr. Trump’s hotels receive USD1 million in foreign government’s bookings in 2017. Suppose he earns 10 percent profit margin on these earnings (so we neglect the issue raised in the first argument above). The profit is declared and Mr. Trump donates USD100K to the U.S. Treasury in 2017. The problem is that the 10% profit margin is across the entire group of hotels, not across the individual rooms and services supplied in exchange for the USD1 million foreign Governments' payments. As the result, 10% margin reflects costs and investments undertaken by the whole group. Foreign earnings, therefore, can be used to fund internal investment activities, ammortization and capital replacement costs, hiring costs, new services deployments etc. All of which will increase the value of Mr. Trump's hotels, including hotels that did not collect foreign payments.

In the mean time, Mr. Trump's business earnings did increase in 2017 by USD1 million as the result of the assumed foreign governments' payments. If this increase is viewed as organic or permanent, rather than a one-off windfall, his business value will increase as the result of these 2017 earnings even independent of the aforementioned investment. Why? Because companies are valued on the basis of their cash flow. Not on the basis of declared profits.

Furthermore, foreign governments' paid earnings will increase Mr. Triump's businesses capacity to borrow and raise equity. These increased borrowings and equity raises can further be used to invest in new business capital. This too will enhance business valuations for Mr. Trump.

In simple terms, even after donating his profits, Mr. Trump will be able to still gain substantially from increased revenues paid for by foreign governments. 

Thirdly, there is a host of other implications relating to Mr. Trump’s plan. 
  1. It will be hard to account for all payments by ‘foreign governments’ because many such payments can come via private foreign and even domestic companies, foreign organisations and foreign individuals, or for that matter, via domestic agents and agencies acting on behalf of these foreign governments. 
  2. How will the donations to Treasury be treated under the U.S. tax laws is material as well. If these are treated as charitable donations, they can be tax deductible, creating a tax shield for Mr. Trump. This tax shield can be extremely valuable, especially if his businesses use foreign-funded earnings to borrow for investment (effectively transferring these payments into future interest-related tax benefits). 
  3. Mr. Trump announced today that his companies will not be permitted to make any new foreign deals during his presidency tenure. However, domestic deals will be allowed. The problem is that this does not preclude use of foreign governments’ payments/earnings for the purpose of reinvestment in the U.S. Which cycles us back to the argument that these payments can still be used to enhance Mr. Trump’s business valuations.

In simple terms, Mr. Trump’s plan to prevent conflicts of interest arising does not add up to reducing incentives for conflict of interest. It is a fig leaf of corporate governance.